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Does long-term object priming
depend on the explicit detection of
object identity at encoding?
Carlos A. Gomes1,2*† and Andrew Mayes1
1 Human Memory Laboratory, School of Psychological Sciences, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK, 2 Department of
Psychology, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany
It is currently unclear whether objects have to be explicitly identified at encoding
for reliable behavioral long-term object priming to occur. We conducted two
experiments that investigated long-term object and non-object priming using a
selective-attention encoding manipulation that reduces explicit object identification.
In Experiment 1, participants either counted dots flashed within an object picture
(shallow encoding) or engaged in an animacy task (deep encoding) at study,
whereas, at test, they performed an object-decision task. Priming, as measured
by reaction times (RTs), was observed for both types of encoding, and was of
equivalent magnitude. In Experiment 2, non-object priming (faster RTs for studied
relative to unstudied non-objects) was also obtained under the same selective-
attention encoding manipulation as in Experiment 1, and the magnitude of the
priming effect was equivalent between experiments. In contrast, we observed a linear
decrement in recognition memory accuracy across conditions (deep encoding of
Experiment 1 > shallow encoding Experiment 1 > shallow encoding of Experiment
2), suggesting that priming was not contaminated by explicit memory strategies.
We argue that our results are more consistent with the identification/production
framework than the perceptual/conceptual distinction, and we conclude that priming
of pictures largely ignored at encoding can be subserved by the automatic retrieval
of two types of instances: one at the motor level and another at an object-decision
level.
Keywords: repetition priming, implicit memory, object identification, selective-attention, recognition memory,
response learning
Introduction
It is a well-known phenomenon that a previous encounter with a stimulus can help the subsequent
identiﬁcation, production, and/or classiﬁcation of the same or related stimulus. Such facilita-
tion or bias in processing a repeated stimulus is commonly known as priming (Schacter, 1987;
Tulving and Schacter, 1990), a type of implicit memory believed to occur even in the absence of
any explicit knowledge of previous encounters with the studied items (e.g., Bowers and Schacter,
1990; Tulving et al., 1991).
A topic of intensive debate has been whether selective-attention and, relatedly, explicit stim-
ulus identiﬁcation during encoding are necessary for priming to occur. Evidence that conscious
awareness is not a pre-requisite for successful priming performance comes from masked priming
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 March 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 270
Gomes and Mayes Priming and object identity at encoding
studies. In this paradigm, an item (e.g., the word “table”)
is presented fully visible and preceded by a prime dis-
played for a sub-thresholded duration (e.g., 40 ms) and
often sandwiched between a forward and backward pat-
tern mask, eﬀectively preventing its conscious identiﬁcation.
Critically, the prime can be identical to the target stimulus
(e.g., “table”) or not (e.g., “window”). Performance, as mea-
sured, for example, by reaction times (RTs), is usually better
when prime and target are of the same item rather than dif-
ferent items, suggesting that the prime is being unconsciously
processed (e.g., Forster and Davis, 1984; Greenwald et al., 1996;
Bodner and Masson, 1997; Masson and Isaak, 1999). However,
masked priming eﬀects are normally short-lived (the lag between
prime and target must often not exceed a couple 100ms, although
see Duss et al., 2014 for a possible exception), suggesting that the
cognitive mechanisms that govern this kind of priming are likely
to be very distinct from those that support long-term priming
(Henson, 2003), the latter of which is the focus of the current
paper.
Apart from the masked priming paradigm, there are other
ways to restrict stimulus processing by means of divert-
ing attention away from the target item. Considerable eﬀort
has been expended in determining whether priming can
occur independently of attention during study. One popu-
lar method is to instruct participants to process a given
stimulus (e.g., reading target words) whilst performing a
secondary, unrelated task on distractor stimuli (e.g., digit
monitoring). Initial evidence using this approach provided
mixed results, with some studies showing marked eﬀects of
divided-attention (e.g., Stone et al., 1998, 2000; Rajaram et al.,
2001; Prull, 2013), while others showing little to no eﬀect
of dividing attention at study (e.g., Parkin and Russo, 1990;
Szymanski and MacLeod, 1996; Light et al., 2000; Soldan et al.,
2008). Mulligan and Hartman (1996) and Mulligan (1997) sug-
gested that diﬀerences among studies could stem from the
nature of the priming task administered during the test phase.
A useful heuristic has been the division of tests into per-
ceptual and conceptual (Blaxton, 1989; Roediger et al., 1992).
Perceptual tests, such as lexical decision and word identiﬁca-
tion tasks, mainly require analysis of the physical features of the
items, whereas conceptual tests, such as the category exemplar
task, promote semantic analysis of stimuli. Some studies have
reported divided-attention eﬀects in conceptual but not percep-
tual tests (e.g., Parkin and Russo, 1990; Mulligan and Hartman,
1996; Szymanski and MacLeod, 1996; Mulligan, 1997, 1998;
Soldan et al., 2008) leading to the idea that conceptual, but
not perceptual, priming tests demand attentional resources at
encoding.
More recently, however, several studies have also reported
deleterious eﬀects of dividing attention on perceptual word
priming performance (e.g., Light and Prull, 1995; Stone et al.,
1998; Mulligan and Hornstein, 2000; Mulligan, 2002; Berry et al.,
2006). Some researchers have proposed that the identiﬁca-
tion/production framework (Gabrieli et al., 1999) better accounts
for the eﬀects of divided-attention. This framework distinguishes
between production and identiﬁcation priming, measured in
tasks such as category exemplar veriﬁcation and perceptual
identiﬁcation, respectively. In production tasks, the test cues
trigger a response competition among several plausible solu-
tions, and are believed to be impaired by manipulations of
attention, whereas identiﬁcation tasks are relatively unaﬀected.
However, reports that production priming is unaﬀected by
divided-attention (e.g., Light et al., 2000) and that identiﬁcation
priming is impaired (e.g., Light and Prull, 1995) have posed prob-
lems for this account as well.
Several other experimental variables have been proposed to
be at the heart of the discrepancy among the aforementioned
studies (see Spataro et al., 2011 for a review). For instance, it has
been suggested that word priming may be aﬀected by divided-
attention to the extent that the distractor task interferes with
word identiﬁcation (Stone et al., 1998). This is most likely to
occur in certain selective-attention paradigms, in which partici-
pants are instructed to attend to a distractor stimulus (or a feature
of the target stimulus), whilst ignoring the target stimulus (or
another feature of the same stimulus). Because the primary task
does not require processing of the ignored item, stimulus identi-
ﬁcation is very unlikely to occur, or, if it does occur, it is greatly
impoverished. Several studies have found that word priming was
signiﬁcantly reduced when participants were instructed to ignore
the words but to attend to some other dimension of the words
such as color (e.g., Stone et al., 1998, 2000; Rajaram et al., 2001)
and abolished altogether if target words were ignored and par-
ticipants had to focus on a distractor stimulus separated from
the target words at encoding (e.g., Hawley and Johnston, 1991;
MacDonald and MacLeod, 1998). Interestingly, in some of these
studies (e.g., Mulligan and Hornstein, 2000; Stone et al., 2000;
Rajaram et al., 2001), lexical identity of words was processed at
study (as indicated, for example, by slower RTs for words than
non-words during a color naming study task) but still led to a
marked reduction in later perceptual priming. These results led
to the idea that perceptual word priming may be dependent on
several fundamental criteria over and above automatic lexical
identity, such as conscious awareness of the identity of the study
words during encoding (but see Mulligan and Hornstein, 2000;
Rajaram et al., 2001 for an alternative explanation).
However, it remains uncertain how selective-attention, and,
thus, the absence of explicit stimulus identiﬁcation, at encod-
ing aﬀects perceptual non-word priming, since most selective-
attention paradigms have mainly used word stimuli. As indicated
above, processes related to conscious word identiﬁcation may be
critical for the emergence of subsequent perceptual word prim-
ing (but see Mulligan and Hornstein, 2000), but it may not be the
case for non-word materials such as object pictures. In fact, given
that pictorial stimuli are more novel, it is plausible that centrally
presented pictures are suﬃciently distinctive from one another to
be uniquely encoded into a memory-supportive perceptual rep-
resentation (Nelson, 1979), which could be independent of atten-
tional manipulations. Although some studies did report selective-
attention eﬀects on later object picture priming, they either used
a negative priming paradigm (e.g., Ballesteros et al., 2006) or
presented target objects in ignored locations (e.g., Eger et al.,
2004; Ballesteros and Mayas, 2014), so it is unclear whether object
priming can occur after selective-attention encoding when atten-
tion is manipulated within dimensions of a centrally presented
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target object as opposed to across perceptual objects as in negative
priming. Furthermore, it is plausible that the implicit perceptual
system is selective, in the sense that it may only eﬀectively rep-
resent task-relevant information (i.e., attended objects) but not
ignored information (unattended objects).
Finally, it is also possible that some forms of response learning
are independent of attention at encoding. Response learning, in
the context of priming studies, refers to a special case of mem-
ory retrieval in which outcomes associated with the processing
of a previously encountered stimulus are automatically retrieved
upon stimulus repetition (e.g., Logan, 1990; Horner and Henson,
2008, 2009, 2011; Henson et al., 2014). Such stimulus–response
(S–R) retrieval is believed to by-pass many of the laborious
operations needed during the initial engagement with that stim-
ulus, leading to faster RTs (and, thus, priming). These retrieved
outcomes can be bound at multiple levels of representation
such as at the motor level (stimulus-action bindings), at a deci-
sion level (e.g., Yes/No decision) or/and at a classiﬁcation level
(e.g., bigger/smaller judgment; e.g., Horner and Henson, 2009;
Henson et al., 2014). For the present purposes, we questioned
whether bindings at the stimulus-action level could partly con-
tribute to the priming eﬀects observed since participants used the
same keys at both study and test phases.
We conducted two experiments that aimed to investigate the
role of explicit object identiﬁcation in a novel selective-attention
encoding task using object picture stimuli. In Experiment 1,
participants engaged in either a shallow or deep encoding task
on object pictures whereas, at test, an object-decision task was
administered. In Experiment 2, participants engaged in the same
shallow encoding task as in Experiment 1 but only non-objects
were presented.
To anticipate our key ﬁndings, we showed that even when
explicit stimulus identiﬁcation at encoding was unlikely, both
object and non-object priming occurred during the object-
decision task, and these priming eﬀects had an equal magnitude.
Priming appeared to have been largely driven by the retrieval of
previous response mappings at the motor level, as it was greater
when the same key had been pressed between study and test
phases relative to when diﬀerent keys were used. Nevertheless,
residual priming was still observed for the diﬀerent-key condi-
tion. In the General Discussion, we summarize the implication of
these ﬁndings for current theories of priming.
Experiment 1
The present experiment sought to determine whether priming
for familiar objects could be obtained under selective-attention
encoding conditions that do not promote explicit object identi-
ﬁcation. We designed a novel encoding task that diverted par-
ticipants’ attention away from object meaning by having them
perform an unrelated task (counting the number of red dots
ﬂashed within the object picture). It is important to note that dur-
ing this task, attention is directed towards a change in the physical
properties of the image (e.g., a change in pixel color) and not to
a competing stimulus, like in negative priming studies. We also
administered a task that involved making animacy judgments
(deep condition) in order to be able to compare the magnitude of
the priming eﬀect between full-attention (animacy) and selective-
attention (dot) encoding conditions. This comparison allowed us
to determine whether fully expressed perceptual priming dur-
ing the object-decision task can only be detected when objects
are encoded under full-attention conditions. We predicted that
positive perceptual priming should occur in this task regardless
of encoding task, but we left open the question of whether the
magnitude of priming for shallowly-encoded objects is reduced
relative to priming for deeply-encoded objects. Finally, a recog-
nition memory task was also employed on a separate group of
participants, using the same study procedure as the participants
assigned to the priming task.
Methods
Participants
Forty-six undergraduate students enrolled in the Psychology
course at the University of Manchester were recruited. All par-
ticipants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave
informed written consent to take part in this study.
Materials
Sixty black-and-white pictures of common objects were selected
from an online clipart database1. Shadows and other external
features were removed from the pictures and all images were
rescaled to ﬁt in a box of 400 by 400 pixels. Half of the pictures
comprised animate objects (e.g., animals) whereas the other half
represented inanimate objects (e.g., vehicles). In addition, a dif-
ferent set of 30 pictures depicting new objects were altered to
create the non-objects used in the test task (see Figure 1 for an
example, and Gomes and Mayes, 2014 for details about how these
non-objects were created).
Procedure
Figure 1 shows the experimental design used in this experiment.
Participants engaged in two diﬀerent tasks at study: in the “dot”
task, they indicated whether they had seen either one or two red
dots ﬂashed within the picture whereas in the “animacy” task,
they indicated whether a picture depicted an animate or inani-
mate object. The encoding task was randomly selected on each
trial and a cue word was always shown before the presentation
of a picture to inform participants which task they were about to
perform. For each participant, 40 pictures out of the entire pic-
ture pool were randomly assigned to the animacy task (20) and
to the dot (20) task, with the constraint that for each task, half of
the pictures depicted animate objects whereas the other half inan-
imate objects. Each study trial began with a ﬁxation cross shown
for 1000 ms followed by the cue word, also presented for 1000ms.
A picture of an object was presented straight after the cue for
1500 ms. If the dot task was used, each dot was brieﬂy ﬂashed for
500 ms after picture onset and at a random location within the
image. When two dots were presented, they were shown sequen-
tially with an interval of∼200ms between them, and the two dots
always appeared at diﬀerent random locations within the object
picture. Accuracy was emphasized and participants were told to
1http://www.clipart.com/
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental paradigm of Experiment 1. At study (top),
participants either counted the number of red dots flashed within the object
picture (dot task) or judged whether an object was either animate or inanimate
(animacy task). At test (bottom), they decided whether a picture represented
either an object or non-object (object-decision task). The numbers above each
event correspond to the duration of those events in milliseconds. Oldanimacy,
objects studied during the animacy task; Olddot, objects studied during the dot
task; New, unstudied objects; Non-object, non-objects.
ignore the images, as attending to the images could interfere with
task performance. They were also made aware that the dots could
appear at any time during the image’s presentation, and were
encouraged to scan the image thoroughly until it went oﬀ the
screen. These instructions were used to ensure that participants
were fully engaged in the dot task and to reduce the likelihood of
explicit object processing and identiﬁcation. Participants pressed
one of the control keys on the keyboard for animate/one-dot
decisions, and the other control key for inanimate/two-dots deci-
sions. Immediately after the study phase, half of the participants
were randomly selected to perform the priming task whereas
the remaining half engaged in the recognition task. For the test
phase of the priming task, 20 new pictures of objects as well as
an additional 30 pictures of non-objects were shown along with
the 40 studied objects (half of them had been presented dur-
ing the dot task and the other half during the animacy task).
Participants were instructed to decide as quickly and as accu-
rately as possible whether a picture represented an object or a
non-object (object-decision task). Each test trial was initiated by
a ﬁxation cross for 1000 ms followed by a brief presentation of
either an object or a non-object for 30 ms. By using such short
(but unmasked) presentation durations we encouraged partici-
pants to rely more on the perceptual properties of the images
rather than their semantic meaning. Participants attempted to
respond within 5000 ms. They pressed one of the control keys for
object decisions, and the other control key for non-object deci-
sions. For the recognition task, participants were instructed to
decide as quickly and as accurately as possible whether an object
had been presented at study. This and subsequent experiments
were programmed and run using the Matlab2 toolbox Cogent3.
All experiments reported in this article were approved by the
School of Psychological Sciences Research Ethics Committee of
the University of Manchester.
Design and Analysis
The experimental design consisted of Condition (deep, shallow,
new) as a within-subject factor and Test Task (priming, recogni-
tion) as a between-subject factor. The data were analyzed using
(mixed) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) and
t-tests on accuracy scores and RTs. A Huynh–Feldt correction
was applied to the degrees of freedom of those tests for which
the assumption of sphericity was violated. Proportional priming
scores were also computed using the formula [(new-old)/new]
2http://www.mathworks.com
3http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php
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for RTs in order to facilitate comparison between experiments by
controlling for linear baseline diﬀerences between experiments
(Schnyer et al., 2006); one-sample t-tests were used to compare
these scores against zero. The alpha level was set, for all statistical
tests, at 0.05.
Results
RTs that were more than 2.5 SD above or below the mean value of
each condition were considered outliers and removed from sub-
sequent analyses. In addition, incorrect trials, deﬁned as either
an incorrect response or an absence of response during the
object-decision task, were also removed from the analyses. These
procedures resulted in the elimination of∼7% of trials; errors did
not vary systematically across conditions.
Study Phase Results
The accuracy for both the animacy (0.88) and dot (0.69) tasks
during the study phase of the priming experiment was sig-
niﬁcantly above chance [animacy: t(23) = 79.39, p < 0.001,
d = 17.60; dot: t(23) = 22.31, p < 0.001, d = 4.60] suggesting
that responding was more than mere guessing. Similar results
were obtained for the study phase of the recognition memory task
with the accuracy for both the animacy (0.89) and dot (0.68) tasks
being above chance levels [animacy: t(21) = 67.26, p < 0.001,
d = 14.08; dot: t(21) = 22.37, p< 0.001, d = 4.86].
Priming Results
Table 1 shows the mean accuracy and RTs for each condition
(deep, shallow, new and non-object) as well as the diﬀerence in
accuracy levels between old and new objects, and proportional
priming scores, calculated as the diﬀerence between old and new
divided by new.
T-tests on the diﬀerence in accuracy levels between old
and new objects revealed a signiﬁcant eﬀect for both deep,
t(23) = 3.48, p = 0.001, d = 0.67, and shallow, t(23) = 2.41,
p < 0.05, d = 0.50, conditions, which did not diﬀer between
TABLE 1 | Mean, difference in accuracy levels between old and new and
proportional reaction time (RTs; [new-old]/new) data during the
object-decision task for Experiments 1 and 2.
Mean Difference Proportion
Acc RTs Acc RTs
Experiment 1
Oldanimacy 0.96 (0.02) 569 (14) 0.04 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01)
Olddot 0.95 (0.02) 570 (15) 0.02 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01)
New 0.92 (0.02) 594 (17)
Non-objects 0.92 (0.01) 711 (32)
Experiment 2
Olddot 0.94 (0.01) 702 (30) −0.002 (0.02) 0.03 (0.01)
New 0.94 (0.02) 723 (34)
Objects 0.95 (0.01) 638 (18)
Standard error of the mean is given within parenthesis. Experiment 1: Oldanimacy,
objects studied during the animacy task; Olddot , objects studied during the dot
task; New, unstudied objects; Non-objects, non-objects. Experiment 2: Olddot ,
non-objects studied during the dot task; New, unstudied non-objects; Objects,
objects.
them, t(23) = 0.95, p > 0.10, d = 0.14. The same pattern of
results was obtained for proportional RT data, with both deep and
shallow objects being judged signiﬁcantly faster than new objects
[deep vs. new: t(23) = 2.55, p < 0.01, d = 0.54, shallow vs. new:
t(23) = 2.88, p< 0.01, d = 0.62], but not diﬀering between them,
t(23) = –0.03, p> 0.10, d = 0.01. Thus, priming was obtained for
both deep and shallow conditions when either accuracy or RTs
were used as a behavioral measure, and the magnitude of these
eﬀects did not diﬀer between the study conditions.
We next enquired whether these priming eﬀects were driven
by more elaborate analysis of the stimulus (i.e., conceptual prim-
ing) or, alternatively, by more perceptual processing (i.e., percep-
tual priming). For that purpose, we divided the trials within each
condition (deep, shallow, and new) into two separate groups (fast
and slow) based on a RT median split. This analysis is predicated
on the idea that, behaviorally, RTs during conceptual priming
would take longer than RTs during perceptual priming, as the
result of participants retrieving additional information regarding
some conceptual properties of the objects. Thus, if the priming
eﬀects reported above were solely due to the inﬂuence of slower
trials (which, presumably, contain more conceptual processing),
then priming should be obtained for the slower group, whereas
the mean RT diﬀerence between fast old and fast new trials should
be identical, leading to a signiﬁcant Group × Condition interac-
tion. A 2 Group (Fast, Slow)× 3 Condition (Deep, Shallow, New)
repeated measures ANOVA revealed an unsurprising signiﬁcant
main eﬀect of group, F(1,23) = 255.12, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.92,
as well as a more interesting signiﬁcant main eﬀect of condition,
F(1,23)= 6.53, p< 0.01, η2p = 0.22, with faster responses for both
deeply- and shallowly- encoded objects relative to new objects.
Importantly, the interaction was not signiﬁcant, F(1,23) = 1.47,
p > 0.10, η2p = 0.06, indicating that both the faster and slower
studied objects had shorter RTs than the faster and slower new
objects, respectively (see Table 2).
Next we investigated the impact of response learning on
the priming eﬀects obtained above. As we explained in the
Introduction, it is possible that S–R bindings at the stimulus-
action level could have contributed to the priming eﬀect when the
same keys were used in both study and test phases. In order to test
this possibility we divided each study condition into two groups.
One group contained trials in which the same key was pressed
TABLE 2 | Mean RTs for fast and slow trials (based on a median-split) for
Experiments 1 and 2.
Fast Slow
Experiment 1
Oldanimacy 497 (11) 636 (17)
Olddot 501 (13) 635 (18)
New 518 (13) 665 (21)
Experiment 2
Olddot 599 (24) 799 (36)
New 611 (26) 830 (45)
Standard error of the mean is given within parenthesis. Experiment 1: Oldanimacy,
objects studied during the animacy task; Olddot , objects studied during the dot
task; New, unstudied objects. Experiment 2: Olddot , non-objects studied during
the dot task; New, unstudied non-objects.
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during both study and test phases (same-key group), whereas
the other group consisted of trials in which the diﬀerent keys
were pressed between experimental phases (diﬀerent-key group).
Table 3 shows the data for this analysis. Proportional priming
scores were calculated for each study condition and submitted
to a 2 Response (Same-key, Diﬀerent-key) × 2 Condition (Deep,
Shallow) repeated measures ANOVA. This analysis only revealed
a main eﬀect of response, F(1,22) = 11.82, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.35,
with greater priming for same-key (0.05) than diﬀerent-key (0.02)
trials. Collapsed across conditions, same-key priming was sig-
niﬁcant, t(22) = 3.15, p < 0.01, d = 0.71, whereas diﬀerent-
key priming approached signiﬁcance, t(21) = 1.56, p = 0.065,
d = 0.38.
Although our results suggest that explicit object identiﬁcation
is not critical for priming to occur, it could be argued that priming
was obtained for shallowly-encoded objects because of the inﬂu-
ence of those trials in which object identiﬁcation was more likely
to occur during study. If that was the case, then it is reasonable to
assume that priming would be greater in participants who disen-
gaged from the primary dot task in favor of object processing (i.e.,
participants with poor study-task accuracy) than in participants
who were fully engaged (i.e., participants with high study-task
accuracy). We performed correlational analyses between average
study accuracy and priming performance separately for deeply-
and shallowly- encoded objects. If participants with lowest accu-
racy at study (possibly due to task disengagement) showed greater
priming than those with higher study accuracy, it would suggest
that object identiﬁcation at study probably aided later priming.
However, neither correlation coeﬃcient was signiﬁcant [deep:
r(24)= 0.11, p> 0.10; shallow: r(24)= 0.26, p> 0.10], suggesting
that greater eﬀort/engagement during the study phase was not a
likely contributor for the emergence of the priming eﬀects above.
Because the above result is based on a null result, we decided
to test the eﬀects of study engagement on priming performance
on an item-by-item basis. For each study condition, we divided
items into two groups based on whether participants had made
a correct or an incorrect judgment at study. Because there were
not suﬃcient incorrect trials for an accurate analysis for the
deep encoding condition, only the shallow encoding condition
was included in this analysis. Priming was signiﬁcant regardless
TABLE 3 | Mean RTs and proportional priming ([new-old]/new) for
same-key (Same) and different-key (Different) trials for Experiments 1
and 2.
Same Different
RTs Proportion RTs Proportion
Experiment 1
Oldanimacy 561 (14) 0.05 (0.02) 575 (15) 0.03 (0.02)
Olddot 564 (16) 0.04 (0.01) 580 (15) 0.02 (0.01)
Experiment 2
Olddot 697 (29) 0.03 (0.02) 709 (32) 0.02 (0.01)
Standard error of the mean is given within parenthesis. Experiment 1: Oldanimacy,
objects studied during the animacy task; Olddot , objects studied during the dot
task; New, unstudied objects. Experiment 2: Olddot , non-objects studied during
the dot task; New, unstudied non-objects.
of whether items had been correctly judged at study (0.03),
t(22) = 2.55, p < 0.01, d = 0.57, or not (0.04), t(22) = 2.16,
p < 0.05, d = 0.44, and the diﬀerence between study-correct and
study-incorrect priming did not reach signiﬁcance, t(22)= –0.33,
p> 0.10, d= 0.07, indicating that study-task engagement was not
a determinant factor in the emergence of priming.
Finally, some research suggests that animate objects are iden-
tiﬁed more accurately and faster than inanimate objects (e.g.,
Laws and Neve, 1999; Laws, 2000). We reasoned that if partici-
pants were indeed trying to identify the objects during the dot
task, then we should observe faster RTs for animate relative to
inanimate objects, as the result of participants covertly detect-
ing the animacy category to which each object belonged. We
computed the diﬀerence in RTs between animate and inanimate
objects presented during each encoding condition, excluding out-
lying scores that were below or above 2.5 SD. Predictably, the RT
diﬀerence between animate and inanimate objects for the ani-
macy encoding condition (29 ms) was signiﬁcant, t(21) = 2.20,
p < 0.05, d = 0.48, whereas the RT diﬀerence between animate
and inanimate objects for the dot encoding condition (–2ms) was
not signiﬁcant, t(21) = –0.22, p > 0.10, d = 0.04. The diﬀerence
between the two scores also reached signiﬁcance, t(20) = 1.92,
p< 0.05, d = 0.42.
Based on these results, we, therefore, conclude that priming
in the shallow condition was not dependent on the likelihood of
object identity processing at encoding.
Recognition Results
One participant responded incorrectly to all the new trials but one
and, for that reason, was excluded from the following analyses.
Table 4 shows the proportion of responses and mean RTs for
each response category (hits, misses, correct rejections, and false
alarms).
We ﬁrst computed the corrected hit rate (hit rate minus false
alarm rate) for each condition separately (deep and shallow). A
paired t-test revealed a signiﬁcant eﬀect, t(21)= 11.00, p< 0.001,
d = 2.40, indicating higher recognition accuracy for deeply-
encoded (0.64) than shallowly-encoded (0.29) objects. However,
both conditions were signiﬁcantly above chance levels [deep:
TABLE 4 | Proportion of responses (Pr; range within parenthesis) and RTs
(standard error of the mean within parenthesis) for each response
category for Experiments 1 and 2.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Category Pr RTs Pr RTs
Hanimacy 0.76 (0.03) 1022 (42) – –
Manimacy 0.24 (0.03) 1141 (98) – –
Hdot 0.40 (0.03) 1184 (100) 0.37 (0.03) 1262 (55)
Mdot 0.60 (0.03) 1020 (59) 0.63 (0.03) 1275 (69)
CR 0.89 (0.02) 962 (48) 0.76 (0.03) 1284 (72)
FA 0.11 (0.02) 1340 (137) 0.24 (0.03) 1442 (97)
Hanimacy, hit rate for objects encoded during the animacy task; Manimacy, misses for
objects encoded during the animacy task; Hdot , hit rate for objects encoded during
the dot task; Mdot, misses for objects encoded during the dot task; CR, correct
rejections; FA, false alarm rate.
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t(20) = 18.47, p < 0.001, d = 4.06; shallow: t(20) = 10.29,
p< 0.001, d = 2.23].
Given that participants’ memory scores were above chance
in both study conditions, the RT data from the object-decision
task were contrasted with the RT data from the recognition task
in order to ascertain whether recognition could have driven the
priming eﬀects obtained above. If RTs during the recognition task
were at least as fast as those during the priming task, then the pos-
sibility that participants used explicit memory strategies to aid
priming performance would be conceivable. However, if prim-
ing RTs were substantially faster than those during recognition
memory, the contamination account would be unlikely. A 2 Task
(Priming, Recognition) × 2 Condition (Deep, Shallow) mixed
repeatedmeasures ANOVAonly revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect
of condition, F(1,43) = 4.85, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.10, with faster
RTs for deeply- relative to shallowly-encoded objects, as well as
a main eﬀect of task, F(1,43) = 71.34, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.62, sug-
gesting much slower responses during the recognition task than
during the priming task. More importantly, the interaction factor
was also signiﬁcant, F(1,43) = 4.73, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.10, reﬂect-
ing the fact that whereas shallowly- and deeply- encoded objects
were equally fast in the priming task, shallowly-encoded objects
had slower RTs than deeply-encoded objects in the recognition
memory task. Independent t-tests revealed that recognition judg-
ments in both study conditions were signiﬁcantly slower than
judgments during the priming task (both p < 0.001), even when
the slowest priming responses were contrasted with the fastest
recognition memory responses.
Discussion
The main purpose of the present experiment was to deter-
mine whether long-term object priming could be obtained under
selective-encoding conditions that discourage explicit object
identiﬁcation. Our results were clear in this respect. Priming, as
measured by RTs during an object-decision task, was obtained
when participants had either made animacy judgments (deep
encoding task) or counted the number of red dots brieﬂy ﬂashed
within an image (shallow encoding task), suggesting that explicit
identiﬁcation was not the determinant factor in order to observe
long-term object priming. Critically, the magnitude of the prim-
ing eﬀect seemed to be both qualitatively and quantitatively
equivalent between the two encoding conditions, suggesting
a seemingly common underlying source. Recognition memory
was also measured in a separate group of participants using
the exact same encoding procedure, but altering test instruc-
tions. Although recognition memory was above chance levels for
both deeply- and shallowly- encoded objects, shallowly-encoded
objects were more poorly remembered than deeply-encoded
ones. Furthermore, RTs during the recognition memory task were
substantially slower than those during the priming task, even
when the fastest recognition memory responses were compared
with the slowest priming responses. This latter ﬁnding suggests
that our priming eﬀects were unlikely to have been contaminated
by explicit memory processes.
The critical question is, however, what generated the prim-
ing eﬀects observed in the present experiment. It is clear that
a substantial portion of the priming eﬀect of both deeply- and
shallowly- encoded objects was due to response retrieval at the
stimulus-action level, given that studied objects that required the
same key press at both study and test phases produced greater
priming than objects requiring diﬀerent key presses. The fact
that shallowly-encoded objects were aﬀected by this response
retrieval mechanism is remarkable considering that the responses
generated during the dot task were based on an external percep-
tual attribute (i.e., dots) rather than on object processing per se.
In typical long-term object priming studies examining response
learning, the studied objects are generally encoded under full-
attention conditions and participants are required to make a
decision regarding certain semantic properties of the objects
(like in our deep encoding task). The fact that stimulus-action
links can form even when the response does not involve explicit
object processing indicates the power of response retrieval dur-
ing binary-response tasks (e.g., Horner and Henson, 2009, 2011;
Dennis and Perfect, 2013; Henson et al., 2014).
Even so, response retrieval alone cannot explain the modest
diﬀerent-key priming obtained. One possibility is that priming
was inﬂuenced by perceptual factors that were kept constant
throughout the experiment; that is, the same picture was pre-
sented at both study and test phases, so priming could have
resulted from the recapitulation of perceptual processes. This
would be consistent with the transfer-appropriate processing
(TAP) framework, which proposes that memory performance is
determined by the overlap of processes at test that were initially
engaged at encoding (Morris et al., 1977).
Even though appealing, explaining shallowly-encoded object
priming in terms of a processing account appears problematic. In
order to perform the object-decision task correctly, object iden-
tiﬁcation is obviously required. Undoubtedly, during the deep
encoding task, explicit object identiﬁcation was not only proba-
ble but necessary in order to perform the task correctly. However,
during the dot task, participants need not consciously detect what
the picture represented, as their sole task was counting dots.
We carefully instructed participants that the objects should be
ignored since attending to them could aﬀect their performance
in the dot task. Furthermore, we also made participants aware
that the dots could appear at any time during the picture’s pre-
sentation, and, therefore, they should look for the dots until the
image disappeared from the screen. This means that, even if
object identiﬁcation did occur, it was likely to have been inci-
dental to the task aims, uncommon and much less eﬀective than
for the objects studied under deep encoding conditions. Thus,
according to a purely processing account, perceptual priming
should have been at least greatly reduced in relation to prim-
ing for deeply-encoded objects. We did not ﬁnd this. We also
do not believe that the lack of a statistical diﬀerence between
the two encoding conditions was due to a Type II error, because
we have recently obtained very similar results (i.e., equivalent
priming for shallowly- and deeply- encoded objects) using a sim-
ilar procedure in a diﬀerent participant sample (Gomes et al.,
2015).
Nevertheless, to conﬁrm that explicit object identiﬁcation is
unnecessary for object priming to take place (at least, using the
study/test procedure employed in this study), one must be able to
show that priming can occur for stimuli that cannot be identiﬁed
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under the conditions imposed by our experimental paradigm.
This was the motivation for conducting Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 showed that behavioral priming can be obtained
under impoverished encoding conditions that do not promote
explicit object identiﬁcation. However, it is still possible that
objects were identiﬁed; especially considering that recognition
memory under the same shallow encoding conditions was still
above chance. Nevertheless, identiﬁcation during the recognition
memory test may have been only partial (e.g., the general shape
of the object, or a particular salient feature), which could have
been suﬃcient to support above-chance recognition memory lev-
els. In the present experiment, we tested whether priming can
be obtained even when object identiﬁcation is extremely unlikely
to have occurred. We decided to use the non-objects from the
test phase of Experiment 1 (as opposed to, for example, abstract
shapes) in the study phase of the present experiment since these
non-objects lack meaning but are perceptually similar to the
objects utilized in Experiment 1 (e.g., similar line complexity, spa-
tial frequencies), making the two experiments more comparable.
At test, participants performed either the object-decision task or
a recognition memory test.
Methods
Participants
Forty-four undergraduate students enrolled in the Psychology
course at the University of Manchester were recruited. All par-
ticipants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave
informed written consent to take part in this study. Four partici-
pants were excluded; one showed extreme diﬃculties in perform-
ing the tasks and three due to a technical error.
Materials, Procedure, and Design
The materials, procedure, and design used in this experiment
were identical to those described for Experiment 1 with the
following exceptions. First, there was a total of 60 images of non-
objects and 30 pictures of objects. Second, 30 non-objects were
presented at study whereas at test, these 30 studied non-objects
were shown along with 30 new non-objects as well as 30 pictures
of objects. Third, we decided to administer only the dot task at
encoding, as we were concerned that if participants were required
to identify the non-objects during the animacy task, they would
try to identify them also during the dot task. Finally, in order to
increase non-object accuracy to a level similar to that observed for
objects in Experiment 1, non-objects were presented for 200 ms
during the object-decision task.
Results
RTs that were more than 2.5 SD above or below the mean value of
each condition were considered outliers and removed from sub-
sequent analyses. In addition, incorrect trials, deﬁned as either
an incorrect response or an absence of response during the
object-decision task, were also removed from the analyses. This
resulted in the elimination of ∼9.5% of trials; errors did not vary
systematically across conditions.
Non-Object Identification
Since each non-object created for Experiment 1 consisted of parts
of a real object which were rearranged into a new image con-
ﬁguration, it is possible that the identity of these non-objects
was perceived either during the dot or the object-decision task
(e.g., participants could have internally reassembled the diﬀer-
ent parts of objects into their original conﬁguration). In order
to determine the degree of object identiﬁcation during either
the study or test phase we conducted two preliminary control
experiments that measured identiﬁcation accuracy. Eight partic-
ipants that did not take part in any of the experiments reported
in this paper performed two tests. In the ﬁrst of these tests, we
instructed participants to perform the dot task, and, if possible,
to write the name of the object after the dot decision. It was
stressed that the dot task was the primary task and that they
should not neglect it in favor of object identiﬁcation (this was
done to ensure that accuracy levels were not markedly diﬀer-
ent from those during the study phase of the real experiment).
It should be pointed out, however, that these instructions will
likely lead to an overestimation of identiﬁcation accuracy since
participants are asked to overtly identify the non-object while
engaging in the dot task (i.e., a divided-attention manipulation).
In contrast, participants in the shallow encoding condition of
the present experiment (and of Experiment 1) are instructed to
perform the dot task whilst ignoring the object picture (i.e., a
selective-attention manipulation). Despite the possibility of over-
estimation, participants’ non-object identiﬁcation accuracy was
indeed very poor (M = 0.38, SD = 0.32). In the second test, we
presented the non-objects very quickly on the screen (at the same
duration as in the real experiment) and asked participants to indi-
cate whether they could identify and write the name of the object.
Again, non-object identiﬁcation was extremely poor (M = 0.32,
SD = 0.33).
Study Phase Results
Accuracy was above chance levels during the study phase of both
the priming [M = 0.64, t(20) = 22.81, p < 0.001, d = 4.92]
and recognition memory [M = 0.64, t(23) = 26.12, p < 0.001,
d = 5.33] tasks. Furthermore, accuracy for the present study data
did not diﬀer reliably from the accuracy for the study data of
Experiment 1, t(43) = 1.07, p > 0.10, d = 0.33, suggesting that
no more eﬀort was applied in the identiﬁcation of non-objects
relative to the objects in Experiment 1.
Priming Results
The diﬀerence in accuracy levels between old and new objects
and proportional RT priming were calculated for each partic-
ipant (see Table 1). Although there was no eﬀect of accuracy,
t(19) = 0.10, p > 0.10, d = 0.03, proportional RT priming
reached signiﬁcance, t(19) = 2.29, p < 0.05, d = 0.60. This
priming eﬀect did not diﬀer from the one in Experiment 1
when either the dot task, t(42) = –0.70, p > 0.10, d = 0.22,
or the animacy task, t(42) = 0.52, p > 0.10, d = 0.16, was
used at encoding. Thus, priming was obtained for shallowly-
encoded non-objects and this priming eﬀect did not diﬀer from
the one obtained when pictures of objects were used. Because
the critical argument is that object priming can be obtained
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despite the absence of explicit object identiﬁcation, we com-
puted proportional priming for only those non-objects which
were unidentiﬁed by all participants in the control task described
above (mean: 9 trials; range: 6–13 trials). Even when the identity
of non-objects was extremely unlikely, proportional non-object
priming remained highly signiﬁcant (0.04), t(19)= 2.96, p< 0.01,
d = 0.80.
Like with Experiment 1, we split the shallow and new condi-
tions into a fast and slow group based on the median RT of each
speciﬁc condition to determine whether priming was speciﬁc to
slower trials, which could suggest the inﬂuence of slower (e.g.,
semantic) processes (see Table 2). A 2 Group (Fast, Slow) × 2
Condition (Shallow, New) repeated measures ANOVA revealed
a main eﬀect of group, F(1,19) = 100.66, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.84,
as well as a main eﬀect of condition, F(1,19) = 4.86, p < 0.05,
η2p = 0.20. Planned comparisons revealed that shallow objects
had signiﬁcantly shorter RTs than new objects in the slow group,
t(19) = –1.91, p< 0.05, d = 0.42, and a trend for signiﬁcance for
the faster responses, t(19)= –1.49, p= 0.077, d = 0.32. The inter-
action did not approach signiﬁcance, F(1,19) = 1.28, p > 0.10,
η2p = 0.06.
Next, we examined whether response retrieval could have
partly been responsible for the speed-up observed for the
shallowly-encoded non-objects, since there was evidence in
Experiment 1 that a substantial portion of the priming eﬀect
for shallowly-encoded objects was due to the retrieval of bind-
ings codingmotor responses (seeTable 3). Even though same-key
priming (0.03) was numerically larger than diﬀerent-key (0.02)
priming, the diﬀerence between them did not reach signiﬁcance,
t(19) = 0.70, p > 0.10, d = 0.13. Diﬀerent-key priming was
signiﬁcant, t(19) = 1.75, p< 0.05, d = 0.50, and same-key prim-
ing approached signiﬁcance, t(19) = 1.44, p = 0.08, d = 0.334.
A 2 Experiment (Experiment 1, Experiment 2) × 2 Response
(Same-key, Diﬀerent-key) mixed repeated measures ANOVA
only revealed a trend for amain eﬀect of response, F(1,42)= 3.23,
p = 0.079, η2p = 0.07, with greater priming for same-key (0.04)
than diﬀerent-key (0.02) trials. Nevertheless, when collapsed
across experiments, priming for both types of response were
signiﬁcant [same-key: t(43)= 3.24, p= 0.001, d = 0.50; diﬀerent-
key: t(43) = 1.93, p < 0.05, d = 0.33]. The interaction did not
approach signiﬁcance, F(1,42) = 0.48, p> 0.10, η2p = 0.01.
Finally, the correlation between study accuracy and prim-
ing performance did not approach signiﬁcance, r = 0.37,
p > 0.10, and there was no diﬀerence between study-correct and
study-incorrect priming, t(19) = 0.96, p> 0.10, d = 0.20.
Recognition Results
The recognition data for this experiment are shown on Table 4.
A one-sample t-test on the corrected hit rate revealed a sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect, t(23) = 5.91, p < 0.001, d = 1.27, indicating
4Although same-key priming did not quite reach signiﬁcance in the present exper-
iment, this was due to an outlier that was over 2.5 SD below mean proportional
priming. Without this outlier the mean proportional priming rose from 0.029 to
0.041 and was signiﬁcantly above chance, t(18) = 1.44, p = 0.01, d = 0.59, and mod-
estly larger than diﬀerent-key priming, t(18) = 1.38, p = 0.09, d = 0.32. However,
this participant was not an outlier in other contrasts of interest so removing it from
the current analysis would be circular.
above-chance recognition memory (0.14). However, recogni-
tion memory was more accurate for shallowly-encoded objects
in Experiment 1 than for shallowly-encoded non-objects in
Experiment 2, t(43) = –4.22, p< 0.001, d = 3.75.
Also, RTs of studied non-objects during the recognition mem-
ory test were substantially slower than RTs of studied non-objects
during the priming test, t(34.78) = 8.43, p < 0.001, d = 2.86,
suggesting that priming eﬀects in the present experiment were
unlikely to have been contaminated by the use of explicit memory
strategies.
Discussion
The main result of the present experiment was the observation
of a priming eﬀect even when the stimuli used comprised largely
unidentiﬁable non-objects. Proportional priming scores did not
diﬀer reliably between Experiment 1 and the present experiment,
and there was no evidence that slower, higher-level processes
were involved in this kind of priming, as suggested by similar
priming for faster and slower trials.
However, because each non-object used in the present exper-
iment was created by rearranging the parts of a real object
into a new conﬁguration, it could be argued that participants
attempted to identify the non-object (during either the dot task
or the object-decision task) by mentally rearranging the diﬀer-
ent parts into the original conﬁguration. In two control exper-
iments, we showed that participants’ non-object identiﬁcation
accuracy was very low for either the dot task or the object-
decision task, even though identiﬁcation was likely to have been
overestimated during these control experiments. Thus, priming
could not have arisen solely on the basis of non-object identiﬁ-
cation. Even if a few non-objects were spontaneously identiﬁed
during the encoding phase, we ﬁnd it extremely unlikely that
they could have produced a net priming eﬀect. Although reli-
able, priming was still small in magnitude, so we would not
expect that a few identiﬁed non-objects would be capable of
overpowering the negative inﬂuence of the majority of stud-
ied non-objects that, presumably, failed to show any priming-
related speed-up. One could still make the point that we did
not obtain stronger priming eﬀects because the studied, but
unidentiﬁed, non-objects introduced noise into our priming
measure and, consequently, reduced the priming eﬀect. However,
if non-object priming had really resulted only from those non-
objects that had been identiﬁed at study, then we should have
seen a substantial diﬀerence in the magnitude of the prim-
ing eﬀect for deeply-encoded objects in Experiment 1 relative
to the shallowly-encoded non-objects in the present experi-
ment, since all deeply-encoded objects had been surely identiﬁed.
This was clearly not the case, as both types of priming were
equivalent in magnitude. Note also that RT diﬀerences for new
items cannot account for the pattern of results between exper-
iments because we used proportional priming scores, which
account for linear baseline eﬀects (Horner and Henson, 2009).
Finally, non-object priming was reliable even when we analyzed
only non-objects that were not identiﬁable during the control
task.
The fact that non-object priming in the present experiment
was obtained under the same study and test conditions as object
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priming in Experiment 1, and that the same experimental manip-
ulations had similar eﬀects on both kinds of priming (e.g., equal
for fast and slow trials, greater for same- vs. diﬀerent-key tri-
als), suggests that explicit object identiﬁcation did not underlie
priming in either experiment, at least when measured during
the object-decision task. These results strongly indicate that both
non-object and object priming are likely to share a common
source.
General Discussion
Two experiments were conducted to determine whether explicit
object identiﬁcation is necessary to produce reliable priming
eﬀects. In Experiment 1, participants performed both a deep
encoding task under full-attention conditions (animacy task) and
a shallow encoding task under selective-attention conditions (dot
counting) on diﬀerent object pictures. At test, a group of par-
ticipants engaged in an object-decision task whereas another
group performed a recognition memory test. Priming, as mea-
sured by RTs, was obtained for both deeply- and shallowly-
encoded objects and the magnitude of the eﬀect did not diﬀer
between these conditions. We also measured recognition mem-
ory on a separate group of participants using the same encoding
procedure but altering test instructions. Although recognition
memory was above chance levels for both conditions, it was
greatly reduced for shallowly-encoded objects, and recognition
memory RTs were substantially slower than RTs during the
priming task. In Experiment 2, we presented non-objects at
encoding while participants performed the same dot task as in
Experiment 1. Priming (faster RTs for studied relative to unstud-
ied non-objects) during the object-decision task was equivalent
to that of Experiment 1. For both experiments, a substantial
portion of the priming eﬀect could be explained by the repeti-
tion of the motor action (i.e., same key press), although residual
priming was still observed when diﬀerent keys were pressed
between study and test phases. Finally, contrary to the equiv-
alent priming between experiments, recognition memory was
substantially reduced in Experiment 2 relative to Experiment
1 and RTs were much faster during priming than recogni-
tion.
The generally greater priming that was found when the same
rather than diﬀerent keys were used at both study and test phases
highlights the importance of considering S–R associations in
priming experiments. Note that the dot task in particular did
not require any processing of stimuli where the dots appeared,
which is consistent with some evidence from the negative prim-
ing literature suggesting that S–R bindings are encoded even
under conditions of inattention (e.g., Rothermund et al., 2005;
Frings et al., 2007).
Reports of priming driven by the repetition of motor
responses (also called stimulus-action bindings) have been pub-
lished (e.g., Dobbins et al., 2004; Horner and Henson, 2009;
Dennis and Perfect, 2013) but they are not undisputed (e.g.,
Logan, 1990; Schnyer et al., 2007; Dennis et al., 2010). One
possibility as to why stimulus-action bindings played such a
prominent role in our experiments is that no other explicit
response was associated with the stimulus itself (e.g., a deci-
sion about some semantic property of the object). It is pos-
sible that the eﬀects of stimulus-action bindings on prim-
ing performance are more likely to be observed when other
mnemonic sources are ambiguous or absent. Indeed, recent
research suggests that multiple S–R bindings are coded in
distinct, but possibly inter-connected, brain structures (e.g.,
Race et al., 2009; Horner and Henson, 2012; Henson et al., 2014),
converging in response-production brain regions, and, ulti-
mately, generating a motor response. If the diﬀerent S–R signals
do interact (Horner and Henson, 2009, 2011; Dennis et al., 2010;
Dennis and Perfect, 2013), then stronger S–R bindings, such as
stimulus-classiﬁcation or stimulus-decision bindings, may over-
power the weak inﬂuence of stimulus-action associations. On the
other hand, if the only kind of S–R binding available are stimulus-
action bindings (as seems to be the case at least for the dot task)
their eﬀects on behavior will be accentuated. Future research will
be needed to verify this idea.
Another interesting ﬁnding was that both object and non-
object priming seemed sensitive to S–R associations in a similar
way. However, the ﬁnding of reliable non-object priming driven
by learned S–R associations contrasts with recent evidence from a
study that failed to ﬁnd reliable long-term S–R learning for novel
objects. In this study, Saggar et al. (2010) asked participants to
perform a classiﬁcation task on novel objects consisting of 2-D
abstract line-based shapes. At study, they performed a classiﬁca-
tion task (deciding whether an object was fat) on shapes presented
either once, twice or three times. At test, studied shapes pre-
sented three times were shown along with non-studied shapes
and participants performed either the same task as at study or
the reverse task (i.e., deciding whether an object was slim). For
the present purposes, the authors observed that objects that had
been studied three times were not judged faster than unstudied
objects during the test phase, and they did not ﬁnd decision-
switch costs when the test cue was reversed (a typical signature
of stimulus-decision learning). In a subsequent experiment, how-
ever, the authors showed that real objects did show the expected
behavioral decrement in long-term priming performance when
the decision cue was changed between study and test phases.
It is not clear why Saggar et al. (2010) did not ﬁnd long-
term non-object priming whereas we did. We should note,
however, that there are a number of discrepancies between
the studies that may limit comparability. First, for the exper-
iment with novel shapes, Saggar et al. (2010) used a relatively
diﬃcult task that relied on subjective classiﬁcations (e.g., some-
thing classiﬁed as slim will likely vary across participants)
whereas, for the experiment with real objects, they used a
more typical size-judgment task (deciding whether an object
is bigger/smaller than a shoebox). If the novel-shape prim-
ing measure was noisier, it would have masked eﬀects that
were probably already small in magnitude. In contrast, our
paradigm has the advantage that the same study and test task
(and associated instructions) can be used, and only the type
of stimulus is altered, thus, making the two experiments more
comparable. Second, the authors used relatively basic shapes
of objects, whereas our non-objects had the same perceptual
complexity as that of real objects. As the authors concluded
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based on their computational modeling data, absence of reli-
able long-term priming for novel objects may relate to interfer-
ence caused from weak representations of perceptually similar
shapes.
Despite playing a central role in the current priming eﬀects,
S–R learning did not seem to be the only factor at play.
We still observed a form of priming that was independent
of key-press congruency, as suggested by modest diﬀerent-key
priming in both Experiments 1 and 2. One possibility, which
would be consistent with processing accounts (Blaxton, 1989;
Roediger et al., 1992), is that this residual priming for deeply-
and shallowly- encoded objects resulted from the recapitulation
of encoding-related processes at the time of testing. Because the
object-decision task involves processes related to object identi-
ﬁcation, one would expect that study-related identiﬁcation pro-
cesses would be reactivated. Although this may well be the case
for deeply-encoded objects (i.e., participants need to identify an
object in order to make animacy judgments), explicit object iden-
tiﬁcation was unlikely to have occurred during the dot study
task. Even if it did occur, such processing was probably much
reduced relative to the processing of deeply-encoded objects,
which should have resulted in a poorer match between study and
test phase processes, and, consequently, a reduction in priming
for shallowly-encoded objects.
We believe that our results are more consistent with the
identiﬁcation/production view. There is some evidence that
the negative eﬀects of manipulating attention at encoding are
most pronounced during production than identiﬁcation tasks
(Gabrieli et al., 1999), although this remains somewhat contro-
versial (e.g., Light et al., 2000; Spataro et al., 2010; Prull, 2013).
The general idea is that the test cues in production tasks (e.g.,
word-stem completion) are more likely to initiate response com-
petition amongst multiple plausible alternatives (e.g., CARROT
and CARPET are valid completions for the word stem CAR___).
In contrast, the test cues in identiﬁcation tasks guide the retrieval
of unique and unambiguous responses, so attentional manip-
ulations at encoding do not aﬀect identiﬁcation priming. In
the present study, there was only one appropriate, unambigu-
ous response during the object-decision task (a picture could
represent either an object or a non-object) so there was no
involvement of response competition, and, thus, no more atten-
tion was required at encoding. This may explain why we found
equivalent priming between deeply- and shallowly- encoded
objects.
We should point out that we are not arguing that percep-
tual object priming is never sensitive to attentional manipula-
tions and/or object identiﬁcation at encoding. In fact, it will
be important for future research to determine whether certain
manipulations will diﬀerentially aﬀect priming for shallowly- and
deeply- encoded objects and, thus, lead to attentional eﬀects.
For instance, some research has identiﬁed certain forms of long-
term priming that can last several weeks or even years (e.g.,
Mitchell and Brown, 1988; Mitchell, 2006). It is, thus, possi-
ble that priming for deeply-encoded objects subsists even when
longer delays separate study and test phases, whereas priming for
shallowly-encoded objects may be reduced or even eliminated by
similar time lags.
It remains unanswered, however, what kind of information
was used during test that facilitated responding in the object-
decision task for diﬀerent-key trials. We propose that an object-
status instance may have been implicitly encoded during the
study task and associated with each object presented at study.
For example, because only objects were shown during the study
phase of Experiment 1 (and participants were aware of this fact)
an “object label” could have been incidentally conceived for each
and every individual study object. At test, repetition of an object
triggered the automatic retrieval of this encoded label, making
information regarding object status readily accessible and, thus,
shortening RTs. The same reasoning applies to the non-objects
in Experiment 2: a “non-object label” could have been formed
at encoding, since only non-objects were shown, and retrieval
of this label facilitated responding for studied non-objects dur-
ing the object-decision task. The implication of this view is that
priming should be reduced when the signals derived from the
retrieval of these labels become ambiguous, and undermine their
utility in aiding priming performance during the object-decision
task. Although not easily testable using the present paradigm,
an alternative could be to ask participants to rate the valence
of words shown on top of the ignored object picture, such that
each object would be associated with a negative word in one trial
and a positive word in another. Later, an aﬀective priming test
could be administered for the picture stimuli. Since the retrieved
valence labels associated with each object would be ambiguous,
we would expect reduced priming under these conditions relative
to when either only positive or only negative words were shown
at study.
If our view is correct, it could be regarded as an extension
to the identiﬁcation/production account because it would sug-
gest that response competition generated unconsciously (i.e., the
automatic retrieval of ambiguous encoded labels) can also aﬀect
priming, whereas when such competition is absent (like in the
present study) priming remains relatively unaﬀected by attention
manipulations.
Although our proposal remains speculative, we have put forth
a similar idea in a recent study, in which participants rated the
meaningfulness of sentences associating two unrelated objects
(Gomes and Mayes, 2014). Associative priming (faster RTs for
intact relative to recombined pairs) was obtained during a size-
judgment task only when intact pairs had been encoded with
meaningful sentences. Importantly, the sentences never explicitly
referred to size information, which means that the information
that supported associative priming must have stemmed from
an inferential process at the time of encoding. That is, rating
a meaningful sentence such as “The elephant was transported
by the train” is diagnostic of item-level relative size (e.g., since
the train is bigger than the elephant, it can transport the ele-
phant); such inference may have been automatically encoded and
probably retrieved upon repetition of an intact pair. It should be
noted, however, that the participants in the Gomes and Mayes’s
experiments were explicitly required to attend to the objects and
engaged in a relatively high-level elaborative encoding task. The
current data extends our previous ﬁndings by suggesting that
encoded decisions can also be automatically established without
explicit object processing at encoding.
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It should be pointed out that the interpretation above still
relies on motor- and unconscious decision-bindings being asso-
ciated with some form of perceptual representation. Because
reliable priming was obtained for non-identiﬁable non-objects,
we believe that this perceptual representation may encode “par-
tial” identiﬁcation (e.g., representation of salient parts of an
object). This representation may allow the binding of motor
and decision associations, but may not be suﬃcient to support
object identiﬁcation. It could be argued then that reactivation
of visual information encoded in this perceptual representation
could potentially also be responsible for the non-motor prim-
ing eﬀect, which would be consistent with a processing account.
Note, however, that simply extracting perceptual information
from partial representations that do not mark object identity
would be of little use during the object-decision task, because
such representations would not contain information regarding
object possibility.
Conclusion
In the present report, both object and non-object priming
were obtained when explicit object identiﬁcation at study was
disrupted by means of a selective-attention manipulation. Our
results highlighted the importance of response learning at the
motor level and indicate that object priming for ignored stim-
uli may also be dependent on the automatic establishment and
retrieval of unconsciously-encoded decision instances. An inter-
esting question for future research is whether these instances
are stored in the typical brain regions that subserve other
forms of long-term priming. It will also be important to val-
idate our argument that explicit object identiﬁcation is not a
requirement for object priming to occur. This could be done
by incorporating complementary techniques such as eyetrack-
ing, which could be used to check, for example, the amount
of ﬁxations to diagnostic parts of objects and/or to measure
the extent to which participants actively scan each individual
picture.
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